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Using a balanced panel data of 915 Chinese listed firms, this paper studies the effect of ultimate 
controlling shareholders on debt maturity structure by adopting random effect model. Our results 
show: the larger the ultimate controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights, the higher the cost of 
expropriating outside investors by ultimate controlling shareholder, and can reduce the agency 
costs of debt financing, so banks are willing to provide more long term debt funds for the firms. 
Ultimate controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights are positively related to debt maturity 
structure. The larger the divergence between ultimate controlling shareholders’ control rights and 
cash flow rights, the more likely of ultimate controlling shareholder to expropriate outside 
investors, and this increase the agency conflicts between firms and creditor, which leading to 
higher agency costs of debt financing, so banks tend to provide more short term funds for firms to 
constrain the ultimate controlling shareholder. The divergence between ultimate controlling 
shareholders’ controlling rights and cash flow rights are negatively related to debt maturity 
structure. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
here are two important issues in corporate financing decisions. One is the capital structure issue—the 
choice between debt and equity capital, and the other is the debt maturity structure issue—the choice 
of debt financing maturity. However, previous studies focused on capital structure issue, ignoring the 
debt maturity structure issue. Since 1990s, with the development of corporate governance theory, many scholars 
show that corporate governance is an important factor in the choice of debt maturity structure (Arslan and Karan, 
2006; Cai, Fairchild and Guney, 2008; Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano, 2010). Recently, many studies examine 
the expropriation behaviors of minority shareholders arising from the perspective of ultimate controller’s separation 
of control rights and cash flow rights (La port et al., 1999; Claessens, Djankov and Lang, 2000; Claessens et al., 
2002). In this way, the focus of corporate governance is the agency problem among ultimate controller and minority 
shareholders (principal-principal conflicts) (La porta et al, 1999; Claessens et al, 2002; Bozec and Laurin, 2008; 
Hughes, 2009; Renders and Gaeremynck, 2012). Many studies also examine the universal existence of ultimate 
controlling shareholders in Chinese listed companies (Fan, Wong and Zhang, 2005; Liu and Sun, 2010). The 
ultimate controller has enormous power in influencing corporate policy (Liu and Sun, 2010), especially in financing 
decision (Du and Dai, 2005；Bany-Ariffin，Mat and McGowan, 2010). However, the focus of previous literatures 
on the relationship between ultimate controller and corporate financing is the capital structure decision 
(Bunkanwanicha, Gupta and Rokhim, 2008; Bany-Ariffin, Mat and McGowan, 2010; Liu, Tian and Wang, 2012).  
Little research has been done on the relationship between debt maturity structure decision and ultimate controller 
(Shyu and Lee, 2009). So, this paper investigates the effects of ultimate controlling shareholders on debt maturity 
structure in Chinese listed companies. 
 
2.  THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Under the background of the existence of ultimate controller, ultimate controlling shareholders have 
motivation in supervising the manager, alleviating the agency problem, promoting the companies to adopt correct 
corporate policies and enhance corporate value, that is, ultimate controlling shareholders have the “incentive effect” 
T 
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to the controlled companies; While on the other side, ultimate controlling shareholders also have motivation in 
expropriating company resources and minority shareholders’ benefits and reaping private benefits, that is, ultimate 
controlling shareholders also have the “entrenchment effect” to the controlled companies (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997; Claessens et al, 2002; Bozec and Laurin, 2008; Hughes, 2009). Ultimate controlling shareholders have 
“incentive effect” and “entrenchment effect” at the same time (Su, Yang and Yang), which make them have double 
motivation in influencing company debt maturity structure. Many studies show that cash flow rights represent the 
ultimate controlling shareholders’ “incentive effect”, and the separation of the control rights and cash flow rights 
represent the ultimate controlling shareholders’ “entrenchment effect” (Yeh, 2005). The divergence between small 
cash flow rights and large controlling rights makes ultimate controlling shareholders have strong motivation in 
expropriating corporate resources and benefits, exacerbating agency problems (Claessens et al, 2002; Bozec and 
Laurin, 2008). The cash flow rights are a cost constraint to ultimate controlling shareholders in expropriating 
corporate resources. The large cash flow rights can be seen a promise signal of ultimate controlling shareholders in 
alleviating their agency problem and improving corporate governance level (Gomes, 2000). And on the other side, 
debts with different maturities have different corporate governance effect. Compared to long-term debts, short-term 
debts are easier to impel companies to regularly provide their operation and financial information to creditors (Rajan 
and Winton, 1995; DeAngelo and Wruck, 2002; Diamond and Rajan, 2001). Therefore, short-term debts are more 
convenient to constrain the company’s opportunism behaviors (Rajan, 1992; Shyu and Lee, 2009), and short-term 
debts have better corporate governance effects than long-term debts. Combining the ultimate controlling 
shareholders’ agency problems, corporate governance level and governance effect of debt maturity structure, this 
paper reckoned that the larger the divergence between ultimate controlling shareholders’ control rights and cash 
flow rights, the more likely of ultimate controlling shareholders to expropriate outside investors, and the higher 
agency cost of debt financing, so banks tend to provide more short term funds instead of long term debt funds to 
companies to decrease the agency costs and constrain the ultimate controlling shareholders’ expropriate behaviors to 
creditors. The divergence between ultimate controlling shareholders’ controlling rights and cash flow rights is 
negatively related to debt maturity structure. On the contrary, the larger the ultimate controlling shareholders’ cash 
flow rights, the higher costs for ultimate controlling shareholders to expropriate outside investors which decrease the 
probability to expropriate creditors and agency costs of debt financing, and the ultra-less fear of banks to provide 
long term credit for companies. The ultimate controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights are positively related to 
corporate debt maturity structure. Base on the above basis, we proposed the following hypotheses: 
 
H1:  The ultimate controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights are positively related to corporate debt maturity 
structure. 
 
H2:  The separation of ultimate controlling shareholders’ control rights and cash flow rights are negatively 
related to corporate debt maturity structure. 
 
3.  METHODS 
 
3.1  Data Collection And Sample 
 
All the listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange market are selected as our original 
samples over the period of 2004-2009. They were excluded from our sample if they are: (1) companies in Financial 
industry (considering the special financing characteristics of these firms); (2) ST, PT companies, since they are 
always related with abnormal financial situations. (3) companies in which the ultimate controlling shareholders’ 
controlling rights are less than 10%; The cutoff of 10% or 20% is conventionally used in the literatures (La Porta et 
al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2002). And most countries take 10% cutoff as the lowest bound of the control right under 
compulsory disclosure (Du and Dai, 2005). Thus, this paper chooses 10% as the cutoff. (4) companies with extreme 
variable values, like those with debt ratio either greater than 1 or smaller than 0, and those with return on assets 
either greater than 1 or smaller than -1; (5) companies with uncompleted data. We finally get a balanced panel data 
of 915 Chinese listed firms over the period 2004 to 2009(5490 observations in total). The data of ultimate 
controlling shareholder are manually collected from the annual report of listed companies, and other data in this 
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3.2 Measures 
 
3.2.1 Dependent Measure 
 
Debt maturity structure is the proportion of firms’ debts with different maturities. Limited to the acquired 
data, based on the previous research, in the paper the ratio of long term debt to total debt is adopted to measure debt 
maturity structure(Arclay and Smith, 1995; Stohs and Mauer, 1995; Scherr and Hulburt, 2001; Marchica, 2007).   
 
3.2.2  Independent Measures  
 
Based on the above theoretical analysis, independent variables in this paper include ultimate controlling 
shareholders’ cash flow rights, control rights and the separation degree of control rights and cash flow rights. 
According to La Porta et al (1999), cash flow right is the right to share the target company’s revenue, and it is 
determined by the capital invested in the target company. Ultimate controller’s cash flow right is computed as the 
cumulative percentage of ownership on the chain. In every chain, the percentage of ownership at the top node equals 
to the product of percentages of ownership in each layer. Control right of the ultimate controller is the sum of the 
weakest voting right of every layer. Let Si denote the fraction of the shares owned by ultimate controller in each 
layer on the chain of control, then the ultimate controller’s control right is represented by
 min(S1,S2, Sn)  
, and 
the cash flow right is calculated by
( )iS  . The separation of control rights and cash flow rights refers to the case 
in which the control right exceeds the cash flow rights for the ultimate controller. For the sake of robustness, this 
paper adopts the following three variables as the measurement of separation simultaneously. Dummy variable DIV1, 
representing whether there is a divergence between control right and cash flow right, which equals to 1 when control 
right is larger than cash flow right, and 0 otherwise; The absolute degree of separation is captured by the difference 
between control right and cash flow right of ultimate controller; and the relative degree of separation is captured by 
the ratio of the two rights’ difference to control right. 
 
3.2.3  Other Measures 
 
Because corporate debt maturity structure is affected by many factors, we introduce the following control 
variables on the basis of previous studies: firm size (SIZE), asset maturity structure (AM), growth (TOB), 
profitability (ROA), capital structure (LEV), and ownership type (STATE). Meanwhile, the industry influences are 
further controlled in the paper. According to the “industry classification standard” issued by China Securities 
Regulatory Commission in 2001, listed companies could be categorized into 13 broad industries, and this paper 
further classify the manufacturing industry(a predominant of the listed companies) into 10 subcategories. In 
addition, since financial industry is not included in our samples, there are 21 industries in total in this paper. 
Agriculture, forest, fishing and hunting industry is set as the benchmark, with 20 industry dummy variables to 
represent the other 20 industries. The definitions of variables are summarized in Table 1:  
 
Table 1: Definitions of Variables 
Variable type Name Label Definition and computation 
Dependent  
variable 
Debt maturity structure DM Long term debt/Total liabilities 
Independent 
variable 
Cash flow right CR Sum of products of equity held by shareholders in each layer 
Control right VR Sum of the minimal equity of shareholders in each layer 
Diverge or not DIV1 1 when VR > CR, and 0 otherwise 
Absolute degree of divergence DIV2 DIV2=VR-CR 
Relative degree of divergence DIV3 DIV3=（VR-CR）/VR 
Control  
Variable 
Firm size SIZE ㏑(Total assets) 
Assets maturity structure AM fixed assets/Total assets 
Growth TOB 
(Total liabilities + Market value of tradable share +Market price  
per share*non-tradable share)/Total assets 
Profitability ROA 2*net income/(Total assets last period + Total assets this period) 
Capital structure LEV Total liabilities/Total assets 
Ownership type STATE 1 for state ultimate ownership, 0 otherwise 
Industry dummy INDUSTRYj 1 when the company belongs to industry j, 0 otherwise 
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3.3  Regression Model 
 
To test those hypotheses proposed above, we adopt the following random effect regression analysis model. 
Because of the difference in time sequences in firms, fixed effect model cannot satisfy the basic hypothesis that the 
effect of independent variable on dependent variable is not changed with the difference of firm and time. 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5  
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j=1
=  + + + +
          + + + + +
it it it it it it
it it j jit
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Where Xit represent the variable of ultimate controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights and the three variables that 
measure divergence of control rights and cash flow rights, respectively; and  represents the intercept item. The 
subscript i and t represent the firm and time respectively. ui denotes the random disturb item，   denotes the 
random error term. 
 
4.  EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
 
4.1  Descriptive Statistics Analysis 
 
   Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics results of main variables for the sample. Long term debt records 
overall mean of 14.45%, implying that companies overall enjoy a relatively low long term debt level. The listed 
companies mainly depend on short term debt financing. Average ultimate controlling shareholders’ cash flow right 
is 33.55%, while average control right is 39.36%, indicating certain extent divergence between control rights and 
cash flow rights of the ultimate controlling shareholder. Specifically, around 43.77% of the companies display a 
separation of control rights and cash flow rights of ultimate controlling shareholders, and the mean value is 5.81% 
for absolute divergence and 16.96% for relative divergence between the two rights, and average the return on asset 
is 4.16%, indicating that Chinese listed companies have a relatively low profitability. The debt ratio level records a 
minimum value of 0.81%, maximum value of 95.69%, with overall mean of 48.92%, implying that companies 
overall enjoy a relatively middle debt ratio level. And there are great differences in assets size, assets maturity 
structure and growth for different companies. About 72% of our sample is state-owned companies.  
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs. Min. Max. Mean SD. Var. 
DM 5490 0.0000 0.9476 0.1445 0.1784 0.0318 
CR 5490 0.0050 0.9200 0.3355 0.1761 0.0310 
VR 5490 0.1000 0.9200 0.3936 0.1533 0.0235 
DIV1 5490 0.0000 1.0000 0.4377 0.4961 0.2462 
DIV2 5490 0.0000 0.4235 0.0581 0.0853 0.0073 
DIV3 5490 0.0000 0.9793 0.1696 0.2454 0.0602 
SIZE 5490 18.6160 27.4877 21.6391 1.0792 1.1648 
AM 5490 0.0010 0.9564 0.3051 0.1860 0.0346 
TOB 5490 0.7341 11.3571 1.6195 0.9214 0.8490 
ROA 5490 -0.9986 0.4660 0.0416 0.0607 0.0037 
LEV 5490 0.0081 0.9569 0.4892 0.1752 0.0307 
STATE 5490 0.0000 1.0000 0.7200 0.4490 0.2016 
 
4.2  Correlation Analysis 
 
   Pearson correlation coefficients of all variables are shown in Table 3. From the table, we can see that the 
ultimate controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights are positively related to debt maturity structure and the 
coefficient is significant at the level of 1%. And the three variables used to measure the divergence between ultimate 
controlling shareholders’ controlling rights and cash flow rights are significantly negatively related to debt maturity 
structure, which are consistent with the theoretical analysis of Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. Other control 
variables and corporate debt maturity structure also have significant relationships. 
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Table 3: Pearson Correlation Analysis 
 DM CR DIV1 DIV2 DIV3 SIZE AM TOB ROA LEV 
DM 1.0000          
CR 0.1034*** 1.0000         
DIV1 -0.0668*** -0.5181*** 1.0000        
DIV2 -0.0594*** -0.4918*** 0.7713*** 1.0000       
DIV3 -0.0683*** -0.6388*** 0.7837*** 0.9026*** 1.0000      
SIZE 0.3403*** 0.2263*** -0.0562*** -0.0150 -0.0660*** 1.0000     
AM 0.3074*** 0.0870*** -0.0816*** -0.0220 -0.0393*** 0.1263*** 1.0000    
TOB -0.1205*** -0.1110*** 0.0531*** 0.0021 0.0220 -0.1410*** -0.1231*** 1.0000   
ROA 0.0230* 0.1019*** 0.0034 0.0272** -0.0091 0.1354*** -0.0388*** 0.2760*** 1.0000  
LEV 0.1914*** -0.0534*** -0.0036 0.0054 0.0117 0.3340*** -0.0051 -0.2237*** -0.3157*** 1.0000 
STATE 0.1105*** 0.3916*** -0.4402*** -0.3137*** -0.4004*** 0.1924*** 0.1593*** -0.1058*** -0.0471*** 0.0399*** 
Note; *, **, *** represent significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
 
4.3  Multiple Regression Analysis 
 
   On the basis of the previous research, using random effect method to further analyze the hypotheses, and 
the regression results are presented in Table 4. Wald value for each model is significant at the level of 1%, which 
shows all the models fit the data relatively well. 
 
Column (1) in Table 4 reports that after controlling other factors that might affect corporate debt maturity 
structure, the ultimate controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights are positively related to corporate debt maturity 
structure, and the coefficient is significant at the level of 5%. So hypothesis 1 holds. This shows that the larger the 
ultimate controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights, the higher the cost for ultimate controlling shareholders to 
expropriate outside investors, and decrease the probability of expropriating creditors and reduce the agency costs of 
debt financing, so banks are willing to provide more long term debt funds for firms. The larger the ultimate 
controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights, the longer the corporate debt maturity structure. Columns (2) to (4) shows 
that after controlling other factors that might affect corporate debt maturity structure, the three variables that 
measure divergence between ultimate controlling shareholders’ control rights and cash flow rights are significantly 
negatively related to corporate debt maturity structure. Hypothesis 2 is supported. The larger the divergence between 
ultimate controlling shareholders’ control rights and cash flow rights, the more likely of ultimate controlling 
shareholders to expropriate outside investors, and this increase the agency conflicts between firms and creditors, 
which leads to a higher agency cost of debt financing, and short term debt are more probably to constrain firm’s 
opportunism behavior compared to long term debt. So to reduce the risk, banks tend to provide more short term 
funds for firms with large divergence between ultimate controlling shareholders’ control rights and cash flow rights 
to constrain the ultimate controlling shareholder. The larger the divergence between ultimate controlling 
shareholders’ control rights and cash flow rights, the shorter the corporate debt maturity structure. 
 
Based on the analysis of control variables in Tables 4, we generate the following statements: firm size is 
significantly positively related to debt maturity structure. It means that the larger size of the firms, the greater ability 
to make long term debt financing. Assets maturity structure also displays a significantly positive relationship with 
debt maturity structure. This shows that the larger proportion of the fixed assets, the greater ability to make long 
term debt financing. Growth is significantly negatively related to debt maturity structure. It implies that the higher 
the growth of the firms, the higher of the risk, and banks are less likely to provide long term funds for therm. 
Profitability is significantly positively related to debt maturity structure, which means that the greater profitability, 
the greater ability to make long term debt financing. Capital structure is significantly positively related to debt 
maturity structure. It shows that the higher overall debt level, the larger proportion of the long term debts. Corporate 
debt maturity structures have no significant difference in firms of different ownership type, but have great 
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Table 4: Regression Results 
Variable 
DM 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 
-0.7279*** -0.7231*** -0.7232*** -0.7193*** 
(-11.1009) (-11.0347) (-11.0403) (-10.9734) 
CR 
0.0358**    
(2.2272)    
DIV1 
 -0.0099*   
 (-1.7679)   
DIV2 
  -0.0677**  
  (-2.1075)  
DIV3 
   -0.0228** 
   (-1.9858) 
SIZE 
0.0345*** 0.0351*** 0.0351*** 0.0350*** 
(11.4931) (11.7020) (11.7009) (11.6559) 
AM 
0.0521*** 0.0520*** 0.0523*** 0.0524*** 
(3.4116) (3.4063) (3.4221) (3.4285) 
TOB 
-0.0059*** -0.0065*** -0.0067*** -0.0066*** 
(-3.1460) (-3.4945) (-3.6023) (-3.5447) 
ROA 
0.0812** 0.0851** 0.0862** 0.0849** 
(2.4183) (2.5400) (2.5753) (2.5343) 
LEV 
0.1849*** 0,1830*** 0.1836*** 0.1834*** 
(11.3497) (11.2525) (11.2859) (11.2771) 
STATE 
-0.0078 -0.0082 -0.0073 -0.0080 
(-1.0596) (-1.0770) (-0.9903) (-1.0726) 
INDUSTRY Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled 
Within R2 0.0685 0.0676 0.0675 0.0676 
Between R2 0.4429 0.4443 0.4453 0.4447 
Overall R2 0.3318 0.3325 0.3332 0.3328 
Wald 值 1063.79*** 1062.26*** 1064.47*** 1063.40*** 
样本量 5490 5490 5490 5490 
Note：*，**，*** represent significant at the 10％，5％ and 1％ level, respectively. 
 
5.   CONCLUSION  
 
Under the background of the universal existence of the ultimate controlling shareholders in Chinese listed 
companies, using a balanced panel data of 915 Chinese listed companies over the period of 2004 to 2009 as the 
sample, from the perspective of ultimate ownership, this paper further analyzed the effect of ultimate controlling 
shareholders on corporate debt maturity structure by adopting random effect model. Results show that the proportion 
of the short term debt in Chinese listed firms’ debt financing is very large and the proportion of long term debt is 
relatively low; ultimate controlling shareholders have important effects on corporate debt maturity structure. The 
larger the ultimate controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights, the higher the cost of expropriating outside investors 
by ultimate controlling shareholder, and can reduce the agency costs of debt financing, so banks are willing to 
provide more long term debt funds for the firms. Ultimate controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights are positively 
related to debt maturity structure. The larger the divergence between ultimate controlling shareholders’ controlling 
rights and cash flow rights, the more likely of ultimate controlling shareholder to expropriate outside investors, and 
this increase the agency conflicts between firms and creditor, which leading to a higher agency costs of debt 
financing, so banks tend to provide more short term funds for firms to constrain the ultimate controlling shareholder. 
The divergence between ultimate controlling shareholders’ controlling rights and cash flow rights is negatively 
related to debt maturity structure. The study has great significance in improving ultimate controlling shareholders’ 
governance behavior and in optimizing corporate debt maturity structure. 
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